Trundling Along

I'm tired, depressed and not in much of a mood to game real life history at present. I think I'll concentrate on Quar and VBCW for a while (which I need to anyway). Having nearly all Quar built (a cat stole one) and a clear day outside, I chose to undercoat them. I only have pure white to do it with, but it should be an OK base for Contrast-type paints.

As for what I've been reading...

Published in the '60s. Quite short, it's thus pretty superficial, concentrating on personality quirks and famous incidents rather than being true biography. It's written in chronological order, too, and in a style that makes me unsurprised the author specializes in fiction. It's not a bad introduction, though.

This one, on the other hand, is new, and quite scholarly. It focuses on the military side of things, primarily strategic and operational. The author's key concept that he uses to rank the main players (Howe, Burgoyne, Washington, Gates, Sackville, etc) is grip - a term I haven't heard before in reference to military competence. Basically, it means partly understanding and recognition of the many variables a general needs to make a decision, and partly the ability to control the units under his command to carry out his intention. He uses Montgomery in the Western Desert as a good example of a general with "grip." Washington and Gates had it, the British didn't. This was mostly because of distance and the fact that some of them didn't like each other (The Americans didn't either, but they still managed to work together).

To Weddle, the reason the British campaign failed was because it was managed from afar, in a strategic sense from London, and in an operational sense between commanders variously in Philadelphia, New York and Canada. Both sides had to spend weeks (months in the case of overseas) communicating, but one was operating on interior lines. Both Howe and Burgoyne focused on parts of their orders that said they could work independently and assume the other would support them, rather than the parts that said they could and should use their own initiative because their directors were too far away in space and time to have the "grip" they needed.

There was also the problem that the goal was to link up the armies at Albany and then, somehow, the British would profit - when instead supply would still be so strained that there would have to be penny-packet garrisons all along the line, and taking Albany wouldn't prevent the Americans linking up anyway. He doesn't mention the parallel, but I'm reminded of the Vicksburg campaign which really did cut the Confederacy in two.

All in all, an excellent and well-researched volume on the campaign, and the battle narratives aren't bad either.

Finally, I've started an account of HM/Submarine Trenchant:

Best known for sinking the cruiser
Ashigara.

Quite good so far, even in the first chapter on the construction and working up; I liked the description of a senior WRNS officer as "the Great Crested Wren!"

OK, just finished undercoating 27 Quar:

Ten Crusader "line squad" and four trench raiders.

Ten Coftyran line and three snipers.

I experimented with an undercoating method I found on Youtube - sticking the figures to a paint stick and wearing a glove. In theory, this makes it easier to aim the paint at all the undercuts; in practice I still missed a lot, and will have to use some white paint to neaten. Still, one step done, a dozen to go...!

Enjoy your week, folks. Two of my coworkers are off so I'll have a busy one. See you next time.